The Rules of Consumption:  The Promise and Peril of Federal Emulation of the Big Apple\u27s Food Laws by Browne, Victoria Bettina
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does
Language Do?
Article 11
2011
The Rules of Consumption: The Promise and Peril
of Federal Emulation of the Big Apple's Food Laws
Victoria Bettina Browne
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Victoria B. Browne, The Rules of Consumption: The Promise and Peril of Federal Emulation of the Big Apple's Food Laws, 76 Brook. L. Rev.
(2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol76/iss3/11
1049 
NOTES 
 
The Rules of Consumption 
THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FEDERAL 
EMULATION OF THE BIG APPLE’S FOOD LAWS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is not just the usual suspects that are causing 
American consumers to suffer from obesity and diabetes. 
Actually, highly caloric fare entices our nation in the most 
unexpected restaurants and food service establishments 
(FSEs). Since the passage of New York City Health Code 
Regulation 81.501 (Regulation 81.50) many New York City 
(NYC) residents have discovered that the places they have 
consistently regarded as more healthful are, in fact, not good 
for their health at all. For example, there are 1140 calories in 
Le Pain Quotidien’s Mediterranean Platter, a seemingly 
wholesome and nutritious plate comprised of vegetable spreads 
and assorted organic breads.2 Likewise, there are 1060 calories 
in California Pizza Kitchen’s most healthful sounding 
appetizer—Lettuce Wraps with minced chicken and shrimp.3 
Unfortunately, these secretly fattening menu items are not just 
fooling the residents of NYC—this is a problem affecting all of 
America.  
In enacting Regulation 81.50, NYC pioneered the menu 
calorie-disclosure movement and provided our nation with an 
essential litmus test.4 The constitutional success of the NYC 
law encouraged many other states and cities across America to 
  
 1 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50 (2008). 
 2 Sharing Platters, LE PAIN QUOTIDIEN, http://www.lepainquotidien.com/files/ 
Core%20-%20AC%20IX%2008%20-%20No%20price.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 3 Appetizers, CALIFORNIA PIZZA KITCHEN, http://www.cpk.com/menu/pdfs/ 
main-dessert-nutritional-menu.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2011). 
 4 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50. 
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adopt their own versions of calorie-disclosure laws.5 As this 
legislative trend was rapidly spreading, it was the appropriate 
time for the federal government to adopt a clear national 
mandate on menu calorie disclosures and take advantage of 
this stepping stone towards reducing our nation’s levels of 
obesity and diabetes.6 Congress preempted these myriad state 
and local solutions by passing the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which included a federal calorie-
disclosure provision.7 In doing so, Congress obviously 
considered the benefits that a federal mandate would provide 
for not only restaurants and FSEs nationwide, but also for all 
American citizens.8 Despite the likely benefits of this law, 
however, this note argues that Congress should recognize that 
not all food-based health initiative laws are constitutionally 
proper. Recent NYC mandates go beyond mere information 
disclosure by regulating what people may consume. 
In Part II, this note will review the rocky development 
of Regulation 81.50 and discuss its requirements. In Part III, 
this note will focus on the Second Circuit’s decision in New 
York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health, 
and discuss how NYC’s calorie-disclosure law prevailed over 
two federal constitutional challenges.9 In addition, Part III will 
discuss how NYC inspired other cities and states to adopt 
  
 5 See infra text accompanying notes 106-30. 
 6 See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50. Because it is outside the 
scope of the forthcoming analysis, this note does not offer much background on the 
extent of the obesity and diabetes crises. However, for excellent recent commentary on 
the extent of these epidemics and their relatedness to calorie consumption, see Tamara 
Schulman, Note, Menu Labeling: Knowledge for a Healthier America, 47 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 587, 589-91 (2010); see also Brent Bernell, The History and Impact of the New 
York City Menu Labeling Law, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 839, 840-45 (2010); Eloisa C. 
Rodriguez-Dod, It’s Not a Small World After All: Regulating Obesity Globally, 79 MISS. 
L.J. 697, 697-99 (2010). For another recent discussion of obesity and its relatedness to 
the consumption of sugary drinks, see Jonathon Cummings, Obesity and Unhealthy 
Consumption: The Public-Policy Case for Placing a Federal Sin Tax on Sugary 
Beverages, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 273, 278-81 (2010). 
 7 See Lauren F. Gizzi, Note, State Menu-Labeling Legislation: A Dormant 
Giant Waiting to Be Awoken by Commerce Clause Challenges, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 
533 (2009) (“Congress must adopt a federal law to ensure that restaurants can comply 
with such regulations in a convenient manner, and also take a considerable step 
toward ending the onslaught of obesity in the United States.”).  
 8 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119, § 4205(b) (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Importantly, 
it has been noted that “there are many . . . ways that the federal government could 
intervene to improve . . . Americans’ health. Legislators could . . . enact legislation like New 
York City’s new law which requires some restaurants to provide better nutritional 
information.” David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing 
Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 373-74 (2007).  
 9 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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similar laws.10 In Part IV, this note will review several failed 
federal attempts to enact a national menu calorie-disclosure 
law and discuss why it was the best time to adopt a national 
mandate. Part IV will also analyze expected constitutional 
challenges to the federal menu calorie-disclosure law and 
explain why these challenges also will not be successful. Then, 
in Part V, this note will discuss other food-based health 
initiatives considered and adopted by the NYC government and 
argue that similar measures should not be pursued as federal 
mandates. Lastly, in Part VI, this note will conclude that the 
federal government has appropriately passed the menu calorie-
disclosure provision in the PPACA and should continue to 
pursue other educational methods to diminish the prevalence 
of obesity, diabetes, and other life-threatening epidemics in our 
nation. 
II. NYC CALORIE-DISCLOSURE LAW 
Regulation 81.50 is now a constitutionally-sound 
calorie-disclosure law, requiring all restaurants and FSEs in 
NYC with fifteen or more locations nationally to display the 
caloric contents of each menu item, anywhere that menu items 
are listed.11 But this was not always the case. This section 
discusses the original version of the law, its prior constitutional 
violations, and the subsequent amendments made by the NYC 
legislature, which pioneered the calorie-disclosure movement in 
America.12 
A. The Law as Originally Drafted 
In December 2006, NYC’s Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene, Board of Health (“Board of Health”), issued a 
Notice of Adoption of the most recent amendment to Article 81: 
Regulation 81.50.13 Through this new amendment, NYC hoped 
to facilitate consumers’ ability to make healthier choices when 
eating at restaurants and other FSEs by forcing them to 
  
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 106-30. 
 11 See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.50. 
 12 For recent discussions of the development of Regulation 81.50, see Bernell, 
supra note 6, at 845-52, and Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 701-06. 
 13 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF 
ADOPTION OF AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.50) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH 
CODE 1 (2006) [hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1], available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-50.pdf. 
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consider calorie information at the moment of purchase.14 NYC 
believed that providing consumers with calorie information 
before they purchased food would result in weight loss and 
healthier lifestyles, and thus reduce the epidemics of obesity 
and diabetes.15 
NYC’s concern about calories grew out of the rapidly 
rising obesity rate among its citizens.16 The Board of Health 
noted that “[c]onsumers consistently underestimate the 
nutrient levels in food items and overestimate the 
healthfulness of restaurant items.”17 While some restaurants 
and other FSEs voluntarily provided consumers with “nutrition 
information,” the methods employed were clearly insufficient, 
as the obesity rate in NYC continued to rise.18 For example, 
many businesses were placing calorie information on the 
company website.19 But the obvious problem with this method 
was that consumers needed to have access to the Internet at 
the point of purchase in order to make informed decisions.20 In 
addition to the company-website-display method, some 
companies published information “in brochures, on placemats 
covered with food items, or on food wrappers, where the 
information is hard to find or difficult to read and only 
accessible after the purchase is made.”21 It is no surprise that 
  
 14 See id. (“By requiring posting of available information concerning 
restaurant menu item calorie content, so that such information is accessible at the time 
of ordering, this Health Code amendment will allow individuals to make more informed 
choices that can decrease their risk for the negative health effects of overweight and 
obesity associated with excessive calorie intake.”). 
 15 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 120-21 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (“Seeking to combat rising rates of obesity and associated health care 
problems, in December 2006, the New York City Board of Health adopted the precursor 
to the current Regulation 81.50 . . . . [which] mandated that any [FSE] voluntarily 
publishing calorie information post such information on its menus and menu boards.”). 
 16 See NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 2 (recognizing that “the 
obesity rate among U.S. adults more than doubled over the past three decades from 
14.5% in 1971-1974 to 32.2% in 2003-2004. In New York City, more than half of adults 
are overweight and one in six is obese. . . . 21% of New York City kindergarten children 
are obese.”). 
 17 Id. (citation omitted). “Recent studies found that 9 out of 10 people 
underestimated the calorie content of less-healthy items by an average of more than 
600 calories (almost 50% less than the actual calorie content).” Id. 
 18 Id. (“Current voluntary attempts by some [FSEs] to make available 
nutrition information are inadequate particularly because the information is usually 
not displayed where consumers are making their choices and purchases.”). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
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these second-rate methods had little, if any, impact on 
consumers’ food purchasing decisions.22 
In considering possible solutions to the rising obesity 
epidemic, NYC reviewed the success of the federal Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act (NLEA).23 Since its enactment, the 
NLEA has noticeably affected consumer attitude and decision 
making in regards to prepackaged food products purchased in 
stores.24 Despite its successes, the NLEA exempted restaurants 
from its nutrition labeling requirements, leaving people dining 
outside the home to hazard an estimate about the nutrient 
content of their food choices at the point of purchase.25 NYC 
hoped that by extending the calorie information mandate to 
include certain restaurants, healthful decision-making 
practices would result because of consumers’ timely access to 
such information. 
In the Notice of Adoption of Regulation 81.50, NYC 
argued that recent reports indicated that an overwhelming 
majority of resident consumers would like to have calorie 
information at certain restaurants and FSEs made available to 
them, and were eagerly awaiting the enactment of this new 
legislation.26 NYC noted that “approximately 2,200 written and 
oral comments” were received from the public, and that “all but 
22 supported the amendment.”27 With this great support from 
NYC residents, the regulation was enacted on March 1, 2007.28 
Regulation 81.50 required calorie disclosure only in places that 
voluntarily chose to post such information on their menus and 
menu boards—about ten percent of NYC’s restaurants and 
FSEs.29 
  
 22 Id. 
 23 Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 
Stat. 2353 (2004) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343). 
 24 NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 2 (“Three-quarters of American 
adults report using food labels, and about half (48%) report that nutrition information 
on food labels has caused them to change their food purchasing habits.” (citations 
omitted)).  
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. at 3 (“Six nationally representative polls have found that between 62% 
to 87% of Americans support requiring restaurants to list nutrition information.”). 
 27 Id. at 4. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 3 (“This provision does not require any FSE to engage in analysis of 
the nutrition content of its menu items, but does require restaurants that make such 
information publicly available to their customers to post it in plain sight, so it is 
available at the time of ordering.”) The new health code only applied to “standard menu 
item[s] offered on a regular and ongoing basis that [are] prepared from a standardized 
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B. The Problem: NYC May Not Only Regulate Voluntary 
Information  
Those subject to the provisions of Regulation 81.50 
immediately responded with protest.30 The law “was met with 
vigorous objection from . . . restaurants and prompted many to 
stop voluntarily making such information available.”31 The New 
York State Restaurant Association (NYSRA) brought a lawsuit 
against the Board of Health32 challenging Regulation 81.50 on 
several grounds, including that it was preempted by a federal 
law, the NLEA.33 In a decision issued on September 11, 2007, 
Judge Richard Howell of the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York awarded judgment in favor 
of the NYSRA.34 The court held that Regulation 81.50 was 
preempted by the NLEA as it only mandated disclosure of 
calorie information from restaurants and other FSEs that 
voluntarily posted nutrition information, which “amounted to a 
‘voluntary nutrient content claim,’ a category of disclosure that 
no state can regulate as mandated by the preemption 
provisions of the NLEA.”35 
The opinion concluded with obvious disappointment. 
The court stated that it understood the “wisdom of Regulation 
81.50” and it believed this type of health-reform legislation 
would be successful in combating obesity and other public-
health concerns.36 Although the NYC law was ultimately ruled 
unconstitutional, the court subtly encouraged the Board of 
Health to adopt a new regulatory approach that would fall 
within the small, unpreempted gap of the NLEA.37 
  
recipe” and did not regulate “[n]on-standard items, including daily specials and 
experimental items.” Id. 
 30 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 31 Id. 
 32 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 363. 
 35 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 517-18. 
 36 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 509 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
 37 Id. 
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C. The Solution: A New and Improved Piece of Legislation 
The Board of Health got the message, and on January 
22, 2008, it enacted the current version of Regulation 81.50.38 
Providing the same reasoning as it had for its original attempt, 
NYC again cited the local prevalence of two health-related 
epidemics, obesity and diabetes, and the need for this 
legislative health reform.39 The specific mandate of the revised 
Regulation 81.50 provided that all restaurants and FSEs in 
NYC with fifteen or more locations nationally, operating under 
the same name and offering the same fare on their menus, 
were subject to regulation.40 The new version of Regulation 
81.50 provided a more “flexible” rule of disclosure than the 
repealed regulation.41 
The Board of Health also highlighted that, in recent 
years, consumers have been eating outside of their homes more 
often, facilitated by the proliferation of restaurant chains and 
  
 38 N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF 
ADOPTION OF A RESOLUTION TO REPEAL AND REENACT § 81.50 OF THE NEW YORK CITY 
HEALTH CODE 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 2], available at http://www. 
nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-50-0108.pdf (“[T]he Federal 
court clearly affirmed the authority of local governments to mandate that restaurants 
disclose nutritional information.”); see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 
556 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2009); Gizzi, supra note 7, at 518 (“[T]he New York City Board 
of Health voted to adopt a new bill to require menu-labeling, this time applying the 
provision to all New York chain restaurants, not just those that already provide nutrition 
information to the public.”); Diane Cardwell, City Tries Again to Require Restaurants to 
Post Calories, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at B2. 
 39 NOTICE OF ADOPTION 2, supra note 38, at 2-4 (discussing the epidemics and 
noting that “diabetes has more [than] doubled in New York City in the past decade, 
and hospitalizations for long-term complications of diabetes have been rising steadily”). 
 40 Id. at 10. “Fifteen was found to be an appropriate cut-off to focus on chains 
with standardized menus, and will cover the vast majority of such chain restaurant 
locations.” Id. 
 41 Id. at 11 (“The reenacted rule . . . provides one, more flexible standard for 
displaying calorie information, incorporating the lessons learned by the [Board of 
Health] from its analysis of many proposed alternative designs and its discussions with 
industry representatives. All of the alternative design elements that were considered 
approvable have been incorporated into the reenacted rule.”). The current standard can 
be summed up as follows: 
Calorie information will have to be displayed as prominently as either the 
menu item’s name or price . . . . [and] will also be provided on item tags 
where food is displayed. . . . This rule mandates posting only of calories, the 
single most important piece of nutrition information, at the point of selection. 
FSEs are, of course, not . . . precluded from providing additional nutrition 
information voluntarily. . . . [and] are also free to add disclaimers about 
possible slight variations from listed calorie content. 
Id. 
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FSEs serving easily attainable and inexpensive food.42 Since 
most consumers are not knowledgeable about the nutritional 
information of the menu items they purchase for consumption, 
nor are they likely to accurately estimate the caloric content of 
these items, NYC once again stressed that without Regulation 
81.50, its residents would continue to practice uninformed 
nutritional decision-making and gain weight.43 NYC specifically 
emphasized the “calorie information gap. . . . contributing to 
people choosing higher calorie items” and that providing such 
information “in a time, place, and manner that can inform 
decisions will help bridge this gap.”44 NYC concluded its new 
proposal by providing information based on statistics and local 
polls, which displayed remarkable results.45 For example, 
consumers with the calorie information of menu items at the 
point of purchase tended to consume approximately fifty less 
calories than those without that information, and also selected 
items with almost 100 fewer calories than their original menu 
choices.46 As these results showed a dramatic decrease in caloric 
consumption, it followed that the new menu calorie-disclosure 
law would likely increase the health of NYC citizens. The only 
remaining obstacle was whether Regulation 81.50 could 
successfully fight another constitutional battle against the 
NYSRA. 
III. ROUND II: NYSRA V. N.Y.C. BOARD OF HEALTH 
The NYSRA again challenged Regulation 81.50 in 
court.47 This time, however, the NYSRA was not met with the 
same favorable result. The following section discusses the 
NYSRA’s undersupported preemption challenge, meritless 
First Amendment claim, and failed arguments that the court 
should review the issue using a higher level of scrutiny.48 
  
 42 Id. at 1-2.  
 43 Id. at 5 (“[T]he systematic underestimation of calories suggests that 
consumers have distorted perceptions of calorie content and de facto have been misled 
to view oversized, high-calorie portions as ‘normal’ portions, containing acceptable 
numbers of calories.”).  
 44 Id. at 6. 
 45 Id. at 6-7. 
 46 Id. at 7. 
 47 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 545 F. Supp. 2d 363 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 48 For other recent discussions of the NYSRA’s unsuccessful second attempt 
at challenging Regulation 81.50, see Rodriquez-Dod, supra note 6, at 705-06. See also 
Bernell, supra note 6, at 852-61; Jodi Schuette Green, Cheeseburger in Paradise? An 
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A. The NYSRA Loses Both of Its Constitutional Claims 
On April 18, 2008, Judge Howell issued a decision 
upholding the new Regulation 81.50 as constitutional.49 On 
June 12, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit heard the NYSRA’s appeal asking the court to 
reverse the lower court’s decision.50 On February 17, 2009, 
Judge Pooler issued the decision of the court.51 
1. Preemption or Not Preemption? That Was the 
Question 
The first of the two bases the NYSRA used to challenge 
Regulation 81.50 was preemption by the NLEA. According to 
the Supreme Court, in order to determine whether federal law 
preempts a state regulation, a court should completely concern 
itself with the legislative purpose and goal of the federal Act.52 
There are several ways for a court to detect whether a 
preemption problem exists. One, “[c]onflict preemption,” is 
present when “‘compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility,’” or a “state law ‘stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’”53 Thus, in analyzing 
whether conflict preemption was present in this case, the 
Second Circuit had the difficult task of determining whether 
the new Regulation 81.50 clashed with the NLEA in such a 
way that made it inherently unconstitutional. Throughout nine 
pages of detailed discussion, Judge Pooler upheld the law as 
constitutional.54 
The NLEA “amended the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act” (FFDCA), and dictated that all food sold for 
human consumption must include “a nutrition label with 
  
Analysis of How New York State Restaurant Association v. New York City Board of 
Health May Reform Our Fast Food Nation, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 733, 746-65 (2010). 
 49 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 365, 369. 
 50 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 114 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 51 Id. at 114, 117. 
 52 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (noting that 
the “question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of 
congressional intent” (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985))). 
 53 GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 276 (5th ed. 2005) 
(quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 54 See generally N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 123-31.  
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specified nutrients and other information.”55 The intent of the 
NLEA was to “clarify and to strengthen the Food and Drug 
Administration’s legal authority to require nutrition labeling 
on foods, and to establish the circumstances under which 
claims may be made about nutrients in foods.”56 Although the 
purpose of the NLEA and its accompanying requirements seem 
straightforward, the Second Circuit declared it “a labyrinth.”57 
The court suggested that determining whether a preemption 
issue was present was a tricky endeavor, especially because the 
implementing agency regulations were somewhat inconsistent 
with the NLEA.58 
First, looking directly at the text of the NLEA, the court 
narrowed the focus of its opinion by noting that the foundation 
for preemption questions arose from two specific sections.59 
Section 343(q), “entitled ‘nutrition information,’” discusses 
information that must be made available and mandates that 
“basic nutrition facts” be indicated on the label of most food 
items sold for human consumption.60 Section 343(r), “entitled 
‘[n]utrition levels and health-related claims,’” discusses 
information that a seller may choose to volunteer on the 
nutrition label of its food products regarding any health 
benefits or nutrients in that item.61 Restaurants like the 
members of the NYSRA do not fall within the scope of this 
federal law, and thus do not have to display nutrition 
information of the food they serve.62 However, according to 
these NLEA sections, if a restaurant or FSE deliberately and 
voluntarily chooses to display not just the bare bones calorie 
  
 55 Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The 
Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 297 (2006) (citing 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2004))).  
 56 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 520 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-538 at 7 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3336, 3337). 
 57 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 117. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 118 (noting that Sections 343(q) and (r) “are the statutory bases from 
which the preemption questions in this case stem”); see also Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 343(q), (r) (2004)). 
 60 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 118; see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1). 
 61 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 119; see also 21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(1).  
 62 See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5)(A)(i); see also N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 118 
(“Restaurants, NYSRA’s membership, are exempt from Section 343(q)’s mandatory 
nutrition information labeling requirements; they do not have to attach a Nutrition Facts 
panel to food they serve.”). “[T]he NLEA does not regulate nutrition information labeling 
on restaurant food, and states and localities are free to adopt their own rules.” Id. at 120. 
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information of food products, but also information on health 
value and nutritional content of its offered fare, then it must 
conform to both sections.63 
The court also looked at the language of the 
supplementary agency regulations passed in accordance with 
the NLEA.64 It found that a distinction was drawn between 
nutrition information and nutrition claims, with the former 
open to expansion by state and local legislation, while the 
latter is completely preempted by the NLEA.65 Consequently, 
the Second Circuit had to decide if the numerical calorie 
disclosures required by Regulation 81.50 of NYC restaurants 
and FSEs on their menus and menu boards are preempted 
“claims” under Section 343(r) of the NLEA, or unpreempted 
“nutrition information” under Section 343(q) of the federal 
law.66 
On one hand, the court found that the NLEA defined 
“nutrition information” to mean objective reports, displaying 
simply the numerical quantity of calories in a food item.67 On 
the other hand, the NLEA characterized “claims” as being 
subjective statements on food labels or other branding criteria 
that in any way, explicitly or implicitly, depict a level of 
nutrients or are related to the overall health benefits offered by 
the food product.68 Therefore, in most cases, it would be obvious 
to a court when a state or local law regulated objective or 
  
 63 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120 (“When a restaurant chooses to 
characterize the level of any nutrient which is of the type required by Section 343(q) to 
be in the label or labeling of the food, it must conform to Section 343(r)’s requirements.” 
(citation omitted)). “The NLEA, however, does generally regulate nutrition content 
claims on restaurant foods, and states and localities may only adopt rules that are 
identical to those provided in the NLEA.” Id. 
 64 Specifically, two of the agency regulations, 343-1(a)(4) and 343-1(a)(5), were 
passed as counterparts to the two aforementioned NLEA sections, and exist to further 
dictate the scope of the NLEA’s preemption on state and local legislation. See N.Y. State 
Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120. The first, 343-1(a)(4), relates to NLEA Section 343(q) and 
“preempts any state or local requirement for nutrition labeling of food that is not identical 
to the requirement of section 343(q), except a requirement for nutrition labeling of food 
which is exempt (i.e. restaurant exception).” Id. The second, 343-1(a)(5), relates to NLEA 
Section 343(r) and explicitly “preempts state or local governments from imposing any 
requirement on nutrient content claims made by a food purveyor in the label or labeling 
of food that is not identical to the requirement of section 343(r).” Id. 
 65 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 123.  
 66 Id. 
 67 See 21 U.S.C § 343(q)(1)(c) (2004); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(c)(1) (2006); see also 
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 124. 
 68 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 124-25. The agency regulation 
describes “calorie content claims” to include “calorie free, free of calories . . . without 
calories, trivial source of calories, negligible source of calories, [and] dietarily 
insignificant source of calories.” 21 C.F.R. § 101.60(b)(1) (2006).  
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subjective labeling of foods, and thus whether such legislation 
is preempted.69 In this case, the type of menu labeling 
information controlled by Regulation 81.50 was neither 
confusing nor ambiguous.70 The court determined that Section 
343(r) provided that 
in order for a Section 343(q)-type statement not to be a claim . . . it 
must appear with the other information required or permitted by the 
NLEA for packaged food, or applicable state or local law for 
restaurant food, which here, would be that required by Regulation 
81.50—the total number of calories.71 
Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the NLEA did not 
preempt the current version of Regulation 81.50, as it only 
mandated the disclosure of “quantitative information,”72 but 
that the law prohibited any further regulation by the Board of 
Health on “nutrient content claims.”73 Accordingly, Regulation 
81.50 was upheld as valid, as it merely orders the disclosure of 
caloric facts, and nothing else.  
2. Freedom of Speech Does Not Mean Freedom to Resist 
Speech 
The new Regulation 81.50 emerged victorious from the 
first challenge, but still faced a second challenge brought under 
the First Amendment by the NYSRA. Here too, however, the 
Second Circuit held that Regulation 81.50 did not violate the 
constitutional right of free speech. 
a. First Amendment Background 
The court found that because restaurants are 
commercial entities, the type of speech they engage in is 
  
 69 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 120 (“[S]tates are not preempted from 
adopting nutrition information labeling laws as defined by Section 343(q), but are 
preempted from adopting nutrient claim laws as defined by Section (r).”). 
 70 See Richard J. Wegener, Calorie Information on Fast-Food Menus? Court 
Upholds NYC Menu Labeling Law, FREDRIKSON & BYRON, P.A. (Feb. 24, 2009), 
http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/marketing/mark_0902_rjw.html (“The court concluded 
that calorie displays are more accurately termed ‘information,’ and that federal law 
does not preempt states from legislating with respect to such information in 
restaurants.”). 
 71 N.Y. State Rest Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 127-28.  
 72 Id. at 124. 
 73 Id. at 123 (“The NLEA does not preempt New York City from adopting its 
own requirements for nutrition information labeling . . . but it does generally preempt 
it from adopting different rules for nutrient content claims.”). 
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commercial speech.74 Thus, a restaurant or FSE may challenge 
legislation it believes conflicts with its First Amendment 
commercial speech rights.75 Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that the First Amendment protects the 
inverse of the right to speak: the right not to speak.76 
Nevertheless, even though the First Amendment 
unquestionably protects commercial speech, the protection 
offered is less extensive than the speech rights afforded to 
noncommercial speech.77 Yet, the inquiry does not end with the 
conclusion that the speech affected is commercial speech, as 
different levels of protection are given to commercial entities 
based on the type of speech regulated.78 
The Second Circuit had previously held that the test 
used for regulations of commercial speech is “the more 
permissive means-ends test from Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.”79 In 
addition, the Second Circuit had found that the rational basis 
test applies when evaluating commercial speech disclosure 
laws.80 In Zauderer, the Court recognized that there exist 
“material differences between purely factual and 
uncontroversial disclosure requirements and outright 
prohibitions on speech,” and that “[r]egulations that compel 
purely factual and uncontroversial commercial speech are 
subject to more lenient review than regulations that restrict 
accurate commercial speech.”81 Applying this holding to the 
current challenge brought before it, the Second Circuit 
  
 74 Id. at 131 (“As commercial speech is speech that proposes a commercial 
transaction [and] Regulation 81.50 requires disclosure of calorie information in 
connection with a proposed commercial transaction—the sale of a restaurant meal, the 
form of speech affected . . . is clearly commercial speech.” (citation omitted)).  
 75 Keane, supra note 55, at 307 (“A food producer may also challenge a 
government-mandated food label on the ground that it conflicts with his free speech 
rights under the First Amendment.”). 
 76 See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[T]he right of 
freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see also 
Keane, supra note 55, at 307.  
 77 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 637 (1985); see 
also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S 557, 562-63 (1980) 
(“The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
 78 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132.  
 79 Keane, supra note 55, at 311; see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.  
 80 Rules “mandating that commercial actors disclose commercial information” 
are subject to the rational basis test. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 
114-15 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 81 Id. at 113. 
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subjected Regulation 81.50 to rational basis review, found that 
a reasonable relationship existed between the new law and its 
intended purpose, and accordingly gave its condolences to the 
NYSRA.82 
b. The Push for Heightened Scrutiny 
In a final effort to save its case, the NYSRA argued that 
the Second Circuit should apply strict scrutiny, rather than a 
rational basis review, as the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
since Zauderer has increasingly recognized greater protection 
of commercial speech.83 The NYSRA further contended that the 
holding in Zauderer is limited to misleading commercial 
speech, and exists merely as a jurisprudential effort to prevent 
deception.84 Thus, the NYSRA urged the court to designate 
Zauderer as jurisprudence limited to the sphere of unreliable 
commercial speech.85 It argued that “calories are not inherently 
dangerous” and because “people cannot survive without 
consuming calories,” the issue should receive a different 
standard of review.86 The NYSRA reasoned that the Board of 
Health did nothing more than assert its point of view in 
Regulation 81.50—that calories are dangerous—and that this 
distinguishes it from what has previously been allowed in 
mandatory disclosure laws based on factual information.87 
In contrast, the Board of Health argued that Regulation 
81.50 is completely based on objective facts that even the 
members of the NYSRA agree with: the calorie content 
  
 82 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 134 (“[A]ccordingly, rational basis 
applies and NYSRA concedes that it will not prevail if we apply that test.”). 
 83 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 43, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of 
Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1892) (“The rational basis standard is not 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, which recognizes 
robust protection of commercial speech and has consistently forbidden forced 
communication by a private citizen of a governmental message.”). 
 84 Id. at 44 (“In the many years since Zauderer, the . . . Court has never 
applied the rational basis standard to non-misleading commercial speech. Indeed, in 
United Foods—decided 16 years after Zauderer—the Court expressly rejected the wider 
application of rational basis review as urged by the [Board of Health] here and limited 
the Zauderer standard to laws necessary to prevent deception.”); see also Zauderer, 471 
U.S. at 651 (upholding the speech restriction and finding that “an advertiser’s rights 
are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to 
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).  
 85 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 47, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 38, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114. 
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information that they were being forced to disclose.88 The Board 
of Health noted that the NYSRA only disagreed with providing 
such information.89 
Ultimately, the Second Circuit agreed90 with the Board 
of Health that the NYSRA’s argument was “completely 
meritless,” because the posting of factual information alone 
could never be understood as an expression of an opinion.91 
c. Applying Rational Basis 
Unconvinced by the argument for heightened scrutiny, 
the court applied the Zauderer rational-basis test.92 As 
expected, the Second Circuit held that NYC “has plainly 
demonstrated a reasonable relationship between the purpose of 
Regulation 81.50’s disclosure requirements and the means 
employed to achieve that purpose.”93 The court credited NYC’s 
stated purposes for the legislation in the Notice of Adoption: to 
increase consumer awareness of the calorie content of menu 
items and influence point of purchase decisions.94 
The court also found that hard facts and a guarantee of 
the regulation’s success did not need to be shown at this point, 
thus recognizing that the Board of Health was not obligated to 
support its legislation with “evidence or empirical data to 
sustain rationality.”95 Rather, NYC’s findings regarding 
consumption habits of its citizens when eating outside of the 
home provided enough of a rational basis for Regulation 81.50.96 
Citing the Notice of Adoption, the court said that these findings 
clearly and sufficiently displayed that 
the obesity epidemic is mainly due to excess calorie consumption, 
often resulting from meals eaten away from home. Americans . . . are 
eating out more than in the past and when doing so, typically eat 
  
 88 Id. at 36. “Here, the inclusion of factual information on the menu conveys 
no point of view.” Id. at 38 (“Informing the public about safe toxin disposal is non-
ideological; it involves no ‘compelled recitation of a message’ and no ‘affirmation of 
belief.’” (citing Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 850 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
 89 Id. at 36. 
 90 See N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 132-34. 
 91 Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 38-39, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114. 
 92 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F. 3d at 134. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Id. (“Citing what it termed an ‘obesity epidemic,’ New York City enacted 
Regulation 81.50 to: (1) reduce consumer confusion and deception; and (2) to promote informed 
consumer decision-making so as to reduce obesity and the diseases associate with it.”). 
 95 Id. at 134 n.23 (quoting Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F. 3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 96 Id. at 135. 
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more than they do at home, and in just one meal ordered in a fast 
food restaurant, might consume more than the advised daily caloric 
intake.97 
Further, the court explained that these findings and 
observations were not only made by NYC, but also recognized 
in reports commissioned by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), the Center for Disease Control, and the United States 
Department of Agriculture.98 In light of this substantial support 
for the goals and purpose of Regulation 81.50,99 the court held 
that the menu calorie-disclosure mandate was rationally and 
reasonably related to its ultimate goal of combating diabetes 
and obesity.100 
  
 97 Id.; see also NOTICE OF ADOPTION 1, supra note 13, at 3-4. 
 98 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 135. “A 2006 FDA-commissioned report 
concluded that ‘obesity has become a public health crisis of epidemic proportions.’” Id. 
(quoting THE KEYSTONE REPORT, FORUM ON AWAY-FROM-HOME FOODS: OPPORTUNITIES 
FOR PREVENTING WEIGHT GAIN AND OBESITY 4 (2006) [hereinafter KEYSTONE REPORT]). 
“Another Study concluded that rising obesity rates led to increasing diabetes 
rates . . . .” Id. (citing CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
NAT’L DIABETES SURVEILLANCE SYS., PREVALENCE OF DIABETES (1980-2005), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/prev/national/tablepersons.htm). “Further, 
studies have linked obesity to eating out. The Keystone Report also concluded that the 
consumption of high-calorie meals at fast-food restaurants is a significant cause of 
obesity, stating that ‘[e]ating out more frequently is associated with obesity, higher 
body fatness, and higher body mass index.’” Id. (quoting KEYSTONE REPORT, supra, at 
27). “The United States Department of Agriculture has observed that away-from-home 
foods have lower nutritional quality than home foods and found a correlation between 
increased caloric intake and eating out.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 99 Beyond the studies the case discussed, many briefs were filed on behalf of 
organizations supporting the Board of Health’s new calorie-disclosure regulation. See 
Brief for Rudd Center for Food Policy & Obesity at Yale University as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendants-Appellees and Arguing for Affirmation at 3-4, N.Y. State Rest. 
Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (“If NYSRA’s First Amendment arguments are accepted, . . . [t]he 
regulatory structure of consumer protection in the United States, which relies heavily 
on promoting information transparency to encourage informed consumer decision-
making, will be thrown into jeopardy, as will the government’s ability to combat the 
obesity epidemic through regulations promoting knowledgeable consumer choice and 
personal responsibility.”); see also Brief of the FDA as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Affirmance at 2-3, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114 (“Because the Regulation 
compels an accurate, purely factual disclosure of the calorie content of restaurant menu 
items, and addresses a legitimate state interest in preventing or reducing obesity 
among its citizens by making accurate calorie information available to consumers, 
there is a rational connection between the disclosure requirement and the City’s 
purpose in imposing it such that the Regulation survives constitutional analysis.”); see 
generally Brief for U.S. Congressman Henry Waxman et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Appelles and for Affirmance, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d 114. This extended 
support was praised in commentaries following the court decision, including 
commendation from the American Medical Association. See Amy Lynn Sorrel, Fed 
Court Upholds New York City’s Calorie-posting Rule, AM. MEDICAL ASS’N (Mar. 9, 
2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/03/09/prsb0309.htm. 
 100 N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 136 (“In view of all the above findings, 
Regulation 81.50’s calorie disclosure rules are clearly reasonably related to its goal of 
reducing obesity.”).  
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Regulation 81.50 survived both of the NYSRA’s 
constitutional challenges. Eventually, the outcome of these 
challenges would prove to be not just a victory for NYC, but for 
general public health reform in all of America.  
B. The Aftermath: NYC Inspires the Nation  
The Second Circuit best explained the phenomenon: 
Now, every time New Yorkers walk into or use the drive-through of 
certain chain restaurants, they are informed, for instance, that the 
taco salad contains 840 calories, the sausage and egg breakfast 
sandwich contains 450 calories, and the premium hamburger 
sandwich with mayonnaise contains 670 calories, but without 
mayonnaise contains 510 calories.101 
And so it began—every NYC resident dining at a regulated 
business was forced to face the calorie content of their food 
choices in the crucial moment when they decided what to eat. 
Once Regulation 81.50 was back in effect, restaurants began 
noticing real differences in customers’ ordering choices.102 
Newspapers, blogs, and other media sources frequently 
reported on the success of the law—its influence quickly 
became a popular headline.103 Along with the local attention the 
NYC calorie-disclosure law was receiving, other cities and 
states also took notice of Regulation 81.50 and its success 
against legal challenges.104 Consequently, these cities and states 
began drafting, enacting, and implementing their own calorie-
disclosure legislation.105 
  
 101 Id. at 121; see also Schulman, supra note 6, at 598 (stating if “the goal of 
menu-labeling is to influence the dietary decisions of a wide range of consumers, merely 
making nutritional information available somewhere is not enough” and discussing how 
consumers must be presented with this information at the point of purchase).  
 102 See, e.g., New York City Rave Reviews for Menu Labeling, CTR. FOR SCI. IN 
THE PUB. INTEREST, http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/nyc_review_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2011); see also Musings of an Obesity Medicine Doc and Certifiably Cynical 
Realist, WEIGHTY MATTERS, http://www.weightymatters.ca/2008/07/proof-nyc-menu-
board-calories-change.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Musings]; Ronnie 
Caryn Rabin, New Yorkers Try to Swallow Calorie Sticker Shock, 600 Calorie Muffins? 
The First City to Adopt Law Faces Unappetizing Surprises, MSNBC.COM (Jul. 16, 
2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25464987. 
 103 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 102.  
 104 See generally State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, http://cspinet.org/ 
new/pdf/ml_map.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (displaying the various state and local 
menu labeling policies either passed, implemented, or introduced as of February 2010).  
 105 See id. 
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1. The Triumph of Regulation 81.50 
Residents of NYC noticed the calorie postings and began 
to change their eating habits. The transformation started as 
early as the first enactment of the calorie-disclosure legislation, 
even before the completion of the initial lawsuit challenging its 
constitutionality.106 Now, many New Yorkers who see calorie 
information on a menu before purchasing fare end up ordering 
less caloric food.107 If this diet alteration in favor of healthier, 
lower-calorie options already being made by some New Yorkers 
continues to gain popularity, it could soon inspire more 
residents and start drastically reducing cases of obesity and 
diabetes in NYC.108 
Journalists, bloggers, and critics wildly reported 
positive predictions about the new NYC law,109 addressed how 
effective Regulation 81.50 would be in reducing obesity levels 
in NYC, and favorably discussed recent independent case 
studies.110 For example, in one study conducted shortly after the 
first version of Regulation 81.50 was passed, a reporter 
interviewed a woman, who was about to order her usual 
breakfast, but then noticed the caloric content of her choice.111 
She found out that her favorite chocolate chip muffin at 
Dunkin’ Donuts had 630 calories.112 This woman told the 
reporter that she “was blown away,” and that she did not 
expect her “little muffin” to have 630 calories in it.113 Similarly, 
another case study documented a reporter watching a table of 
women reading menus after sitting down to dine at T.G.I. 
Friday’s.114 The reporter noticed that these women, upon seeing 
  
 106 See Rabin, supra note 102.  
 107 See ACS Supports Calorie Labeling in Albany, N.Y. ACTION CENTER (July, 
28, 2009), http://www.acscan.org/action/ny/updates/451 (“In NYC, fast food customers 
who saw calorie information displayed purchased 52 fewer calories than those who 
didn’t see the information.”). For an example of a menu displaying caloric information, 
see Menus & Menu Boards with Nutrition Information, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. 
INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/menulabeling/boards.html (last visited Jan 6, 2011). 
 108 See Menu Labeling Laws—Sweeping The Nation?, FIRST MOVERS (Feb. 22, 
2009), http://firstmovers.blogspot.com/2009/02/menu-labeling-laws-sweeping-nation_22. 
html [hereinafter FIRST MOVERS] (“[T]he New York City Department of Health 
projected that menu labeling in the City will prevent at least 30,000 new cases of 
diabetes in the next five years.”).  
 109 See, e.g., Musings, supra note 102; see also Rabin, supra note 102. 
 110 See Musings, supra note 102; see also Rabin, supra note 102. 
 111 Rabin, supra note 102. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
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the caloric content of the menu items, wore identical 
expressions of shock and disgust.115 Following their appalling 
discovery of the actual caloric content in most menu choices, 
the reporter recalled that two of the women “asked about the 
suddenly popular Classic Sirloin—at 290 calories, it was one of 
the lowest calorie items on the menu—but learned the 
restaurant ran out by the time the dinner rush started.”116 As 
the information in these case studies indicates, many NYC 
consumers are making healthier, lower calorie food choices. 
Because of this, it was greatly anticipated that other states 
would soon follow suit. 117 
2. Adoption of Similar Laws Elsewhere 
As was predicted, NYC is no longer alone in forcing 
disclosure of calorie content on menus. With the similarly 
stated purpose of combating the national epidemics of obesity 
and diabetes in their own states or cities, legislatures around 
the United States followed suit and adopted different calorie-
disclosure regulations.118 Thus, “[w]hat once seemed like the far-
fetched idea of a health-nut legislator” was no longer 
considered so extreme, as “state and local menu-labeling laws 
[went] into effect all over the country, forcing many in the 
restaurant industry to comply with their parameters.” 119 
New laws have been enacted from coast to coast by both 
state and local legislatures. Just as NYC was the first city to 
enact a menu calorie-disclosure law,120 California became the 
first state to do so.121 Unfortunately, however, the success of 
Regulation 81.50 did not influence everyone. Some states, like 
Georgia and Ohio, took the opposite route and passed 
legislation that ensures their state and local governments 
  
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. In comparison, the reporter noted that “Friday’s pecan-crusted chicken 
salad, served with mandarin oranges, dried cranberries and celery, has 1,360 calories.” Id. 
 117 See, e.g., Wegener, supra note 70. 
 118 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 502 (“In an effort to combat the obesity epidemic, 
certain states and local governments have proposed or passed legislation requiring 
chain restaurants to post nutrition information alongside item prices on menus or 
menu boards.”); see also Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE 
PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/nutritionpolicy/MenuLabelingBills2007-2008. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 119 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 514. 
 120 See FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108. 
 121 See California First State in Nation to Pass Menu Labeling Law, CTR. FOR 
SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/new/200809301.html (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2011); see also Gizzi, supra note 7, at 516. 
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would never support menu calorie-disclosure laws.122 The 
governments that followed NYC’s lead have adopted various 
types of calorie-disclosure laws, some stricter than Regulation 
81.50 and some more lenient.123 Many of these proposed bills 
and passed laws contained similar menu labeling requirements 
as Regulation 81.50, regulating disclosure only in restaurants 
and FSEs with a certain amount of locations nationally.124 
Similarly, many states utilize a different measuring approach, 
applying only to restaurants and FSEs with a specific number 
of locations statewide, rather than nationwide.125 Further, while 
Regulation 81.50 merely requires disclosure of caloric 
information, other state laws require disclosure of additional 
nutrient information, such as fat content.126 
As local and state legislatures increasingly adopted 
more calorie-disclosure bills, the burden on restaurants and 
FSEs with locations across the United States was bound to 
increase. These national and regional chains already had 
dozens of laws to comply with,127 sometimes even varying within 
the same state.128 As nutrition disclosure laws multiply, so too 
  
 122 See Restaurant Industry Successes in Menu Board/Calorie Posting Wars, 
NOWPUBLIC.COM, http://www.nowpublic.com/health/restaurant-industry-successes-menu-
board-calorie-posting-wars (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). 
 123 For examples of laws that are more strict than Regulation 81.50, see KINGS 
CNTY., WASH. BD. OF HEALTH CODE, ch. 5.10.015 (2008) (“The nutrition labeling of food 
shall include, but not be limited to, the total number of calories; . . . [t]otal number of 
grams of saturated fat; . . . carbohydrate; and . . . milligrams of sodium.”). See also 
Rabin, supra note 102. For examples of laws that are more lenient, see CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West Supp. 2009). See also California First State in Nation to 
Pass Menu Labeling Law, supra note 121.  
 124 See, e.g., KINGS CNTY., WASH. BD. OF HEALTH CODE, ch. 5.10.015 (stating 
that the labeling law requires restaurants with fifteen or more locations nationally to 
disclose caloric information).  
 125 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (stating that the labeling 
law requires restaurants with twenty or more locations statewide to disclose caloric 
information).  
 126 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 515. 
 127 See H.B 54, 24th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2007), available at http://www. 
capitol.hawaii.gov/session2008/bills/HB54.htm (regulating ten or more establishments); S.F. 
2158 82nd Gen. Assem., 2008 Sess. (Iowa 2008) (regulating twenty-one or more locations 
within the state); S.B. 211, 2008 Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008) (regulating twenty or 
more locations statewide); S.B. 1290, 185th Gen. Court, 2007-2008 Sess. (Mass. 2007) 
(regulating ten or more locations across the United States); A. 1407, 213th Leg. 2008 
Sess. (N.J. 2009) (regulating twenty or more locations in New Jersey); A. 729, 2007 State. 
Assemb., 2007 Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (regulating fifteen or more locations nationally as well as 
five locations in New York); see also Gizzi, supra note 7, at 515 n.104; State and Local 
Menu Labeling Policies, supra note 104. 
 128 See generally State and Local Menu Labeling Policies, supra note 104. 
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does the cost of compliance for these restaurants.129 As a result, 
“[i]f even a portion of [the pending legislations in various cities 
and states] eventually pass, [these laws would] significantly 
affect interstate commerce.”130 Thus, absent the national 
mandate to preempt these local and state laws, the cost of a 
meal at regulated restaurants and FSEs would likely increase, 
as these businesses would need to find new ways to carry the 
greater financial burden of compliance. To mitigate the 
financial burden, it became necessary for the federal 
government to step in. 
IV. IT WAS THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR CONGRESS TO PASS 
A FEDERAL CALORIE-DISCLOSURE LAW 
Because of the increasing popularity of menu calorie-
disclosure laws, not only do chain restaurants and other FSEs 
have no choice whether or not to share nutrition information, 
or how to convey that information, but they now also have to 
comply with a variety of special requirements that are 
particular to each jurisdiction.131 As a result of this 
jurisdictional issue, it became even more important for 
Congress to recognize that “the most effective route to fighting 
obesity . . . [is] old-fashioned ‘command and control’ federal 
legislation, given the national government’s ability and 
arguable obligation to improve Americans’ food supply, lifestyle 
habits, and education about the health risks of obesity.”132 
A. Previous Attempts Were Failures 
A federal menu calorie-disclosure law had been 
contemplated for some time.133 Actually, proponents of the 
NLEA were willing to enact a national calorie-labeling 
  
 129 See Kim Leonard, Calorie Disclosure in Store for Food Chains, PITTSBURGH 
TRIB. REV. (Jul. 2, 2010), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/ 
s_688598.html. 
 130 See Gizzi, supra note 7, at 519.  
 131 See id. at 527 (“Now, not only will restaurants be unable to choose the 
method by which they convey nutrition information to customers, but they will also 
have to follow the requirements of various jurisdictions.”).  
 132 Burnett, supra note 8, at 414; see also Edieth Y. Wu, McFat—Obesity, 
Parens Patriae, and the Children, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 569 (2004) (stating that 
childhood obesity is a huge problem and that our federal government should be the one 
to do something about it).  
 133 For recent discussions on prior federal attempts at a menu calorie-
disclosure law, see Green, supra note 48, at 740-45. See also Devon E. Winkles, 
Weighing the Value of Information, 59 EMORY L.J. 549, 551-54 (2009).  
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requirement for restaurant and FSE menus as early as 1990.134 
The law did not come to fruition as “the restaurant industry 
lobbied vehemently against such a regulatory burden” and, 
ultimately, “Congress compromised and provided restaurants 
certain exemptions to the labeling requirements of [the NLEA], 
concluding that the federal government should be cautious 
when intervening in the states’ right to protect the health and 
safety of their citizens.”135 
Though this area was within states’ police powers, there 
was no widely recognized purpose or need to burden 
restaurants with the national menu labeling regulation, and 
the idea for the federal menu calorie-disclosure law was soon 
forgotten. Almost twenty years later, and now clearly faced 
with a desperate need and purpose for such a federal law—as 
obesity and diabetes have become national epidemics—
Congress finally had a change of heart.136 
The federal bill that ultimately passed was not the first 
of its kind; in recent years, both houses made similar attempts. 
First, in 2003, both houses introduced the Menu Education And 
Labeling Act (MEAL Act) to the 108th Congress.137 The MEAL 
Act was designed to “address the lack of readily-accessible 
information about fast-food ingredients by requiring restaurant 
chains to clearly display the number of calories, grams of 
saturated fat, and milligrams of sodium in their food.”138 Similar 
to Regulation 81.50, public interest groups praised the MEAL 
  
 134 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 522 (citing LAURA SIMS, THE POLITICS OF FAT: FOOD 
AND NUTRITION POLICY IN AMERICA 200 (1998)). 
 135 Id.; see also 136 CONG. REC. H5840 (1990). 
 136 Burnett, supra note 8, at 366 (“Legislation in the House and Senate that 
would have a positive effect on America’s obesity epidemic, to the extent such laws 
have been proposed, has almost always been unsuccessful.”).  
 137 See Menu Education and Labeling Act, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003); see 
also S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2003).  
 138 Burnett, supra note 8, at 366; see also H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 
3484, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2108, 108th Cong. (2003). 
Also noting the requirements of the MEAL Act, one blogger stated that the 
bill exempts condiments, items placed on a table or counter for general use, 
daily specials, temporary menu items, and irregular menu items. 
Interestingly, the bill would also require restaurants that sell self-serve food, 
such as through salad bars or buffet lines, to place a sign that lists the 
number of calories per standard serving adjacent to each item, and would 
require vending machine operators to provide a conspicuous sign disclosing 
the number of calories to each item. 
FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108.  
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Act and the restaurant industry despised it.139 The restaurant 
industry focused its protests against an intentional gap in the 
federal legislation, which gave states the option to regulate the 
disclosure of more information than the law required.140 This 
first attempt at a federal menu calorie labeling law was strict—
perhaps too strict—and for this reason it died in committee in 
the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congresses.141 
Then, in September 2008, the Senate introduced the 
Labeling Education And Nutrition Act (LEAN Act) to the 110th 
Congress.142 This also never became more than a bill.143 Refusing 
to accept defeat, both houses, as recently as March 2009, 
reintroduced companion LEAN Acts to the 111th Congress.144 
This proposed legislation  
look[ed] to expand current packaged food labeling law to require a 
uniform national nutrition labeling standard for chain [FSEs], while 
providing a reasonable range of flexibility for the restaurant. While 
the LEAN Act would require a uniform national nutrition standard, 
the law also would provide for a single set of guidelines in [sic] how 
nutrition information is calculated and will provide legal protection 
for those restaurants that abide by the law. As larger chain 
restaurants with standard menus and standard methods of 
preparation are better situated to meet such requirements, the 
LEAN Act would apply only to chains with 20 or more units.145 
  
 139 See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 4-10, N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. 
N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-1892); see also FIRST MOVERS, 
supra note 108. 
 140 FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108. 
 141 See Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 3444, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:h3444: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); see also H.R. 
3895:MEAL Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-3895 (last visited Jan. 
8, 2011); Bill Summary and Status, H.R. 5563, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http:// 
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h5563: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); Bill Summary and 
Status, S. 3484, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z? 
d109:SN03484: (last visited Feb. 6, 2011); Bill Summary and Status, S. 2108, 108th Cong. 
(2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:s2108: (last visited Feb. 6, 
2011). 
 142 Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2008, S. 3575, 110th Cong. (2008).  
 143 See H.R. 1398, 111th Cong. (2009); see also S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009); Bill 
Summary and Status, H.R. 1398, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01398:|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|; Bill Summary 
and Status, S. 558, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z? 
d111:SN00558:|/home/LegislativeData.php?n=BSS;c=111|. 
 144 Also, the National Restaurant Association has urged members of Congress 
to co-sponsor the LEAN Act of 2008. See Public Policy Issue Briefs, NAT’L RESTAURANT 
ASSOC., http://www.restaurant.org/government/issues/issue.cfm?Issue=menulabel (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2011).  
 145 Jim Coen, Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2008 (LEAN Act), DDIFO 
(Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.ddifo.org/labeling-education-and-nutrition-act-of-2008-lean-act/; 
see also Evan Goodman, Something’s Gotta Give, But What Will It Take?, FULL SPECTRUM 
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As the LEAN Act was less demanding than its predecessor, the 
MEAL Act, it gained support from many different arenas—
including a former dissenter, the National Restaurant 
Association (NRA).146 Specifically, one of the reasons for this 
newfound support was that this bill was a “compromise,”147 as 
the LEAN Act would only regulate the areas of the restaurant 
industry that our government needed to control in order to 
fight obesity.148 Another reason for the widespread support was 
that a lenient national law would be much less burdensome for 
restaurants and FSEs than complying with the various laws at 
the state and local levels.149 Moreover, as state and local laws 
went into effect, patrons were becoming more aware that they 
needed to be able to individually access caloric information in 
order to make more healthful choices when dining out.150 Still, 
even with this tremendous support, the LEAN Act never made 
it past committee.151 
  
BLOG (Aug. 24, 2009, 1:58 PM), http://www.spectrumscience.com/blog/2009/08/24/some 
thing’s-gotta-give-but-what-will-it-take/#more-595 (“The goal of The LEAN Act is to reduce 
caloric intake among restaurant patrons by exposing them to the contents of what they are 
eating. Because most people do not know the nutritional value (or lack thereof) in food they 
eat when dining out, awareness is a key step towards healthy eating.”). 
 146 See Parke Wilde, New Advocacy Coalition Backs National Menu Labeling, 
U.S. FOOD POL’Y BLOG (June 12, 2009, 10:14 AM), http://usfoodpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/ 
06/new-advocacy-coalition-backs-national.html; see also FIRST MOVERS, supra note 108 
(“Although no federal menu labeling requirements exist, the topic has gained momentum 
in recent years, especially now that the National Restaurant Association is actively 
supporting the Labeling Education and Nutrition (LEAN) Act, introduced in the 2008 
Congressional session.”).  
 147 Wilde, supra note 146 (“First, the bill is a compromise bill, providing the 
restaurant chains with some of their key policy priorities, including preserving a good 
deal of flexibility in deciding how to present the information and protection from what 
the restaurants describe as ‘frivolous’ lawsuits.”).  
 148 Goodman, supra note 145 (“[T]he bipartisan LEAN Act of 2009 is designed to 
help curb the obesity epidemic by introducing nutrition labeling of food offered for sale in 
[FSEs]. . . . [It] calls for accessible, reliable nutrition information to be displayed in chain 
restaurants and is a stepping stone on a long path to improving the health of Americans.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 149 Wilde, supra note 146 (“As with other important nutrition labeling policies 
in the past, such as the current nutrition facts panel on packaged food, an important 
sector of the food industry chose to support a new government policy in return for more 
consistent and less burdensome regulation across jurisdictions.”).  
 150 Goodman, supra note 145 (“[T]he consequences of dining out . . . include 
higher intakes of fat, sodium, and soft drinks, and lower intakes of nutrient-dense 
foods such as vegetables. . . . [H]alf of Americans’ diets consist of food consumed outside 
the home. . . .The LEAN Act is only one potential intervention to help curb the obesity 
epidemic in America. This legislation works on the individual level in order to increase 
access to information.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 151 See H.R. 1398: Labeling Education and Nutrition Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-1398 (last visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
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B. Current Attempt Was Finally a Success 
The most recent attempt to implement a federal calorie-
disclosure law occurred as this note was being drafted. Our 
nation had been experiencing a tremendous push for universal 
health reform.152 Thus, incorporated within each of the various 
bills drafted by the 111th Congress were menu calorie-
disclosure stipulations.153 The decision to include these 
provisions was the result of compromise and recognition that 
state and local regulations were increasingly developing across 
our nation.154 Although the requirements of the federal bill were 
not dissimilar to those proposed and enacted at the state and 
local level,155 nor were they drastically different than what was 
proposed under the LEAN Act, strong alliances formed in favor 
of this legislation and groups prepared to lobby for its 
enactment.156 In fact, the law’s one-time biggest opponent 
became its greatest supporter.157 
After many years of protest, the NRA and the “food 
police,” a public policy interest group, vocalized their support 
for one bill, and publicly declared that a federal mandate would 
be the best solution.158 These groups recognized that a single, 
consistent standard would lessen the burden on restaurants 
and FSEs nationwide.159 A NRA spokesperson stated that the 
organization believed that this bill had the most potential to 
  
 152 See generally HEALTHCARE.GOV, http://www.healthcare.gov (last visited Jan. 
31, 2011). 
 153 See generally Nationwide Menu Labeling to Be Included in Health Reform, 
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (June 10, 2009), http://www.rwjf.org/pr/product.jsp?id 
=44028&topicid=1024. 
 154 See generally Sean Gregory, Fast Food: Would You Like 1,000 Calories 
with That?, TIME.COM (June 29, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,1905509,00.html (“Spurred by the passage of a slew of state and local menu-
labeling laws, on June 10 the Senate reached a bipartisan agreement to include a 
federal menu-labeling law as part of comprehensive health-care reform.”). 
 155 See sources cited supra note 127. 
 156 See generally Jerry Hirsch, Calorie-Listing Bill Spawns Industry Fight, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/03/business/fi-menu3.  
 157 Id. 
 158 See id.; see also Public Policy Issue Briefs, supra note 144; Stephanie 
Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to Be Posted at Most Chains, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2010), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business24menu.html (The “measure was approved by 
Congress with little public discussion, in part because restaurant chains supported it. They 
had spent years fighting such requirements, but they were slowly losing the battle.”).  
 159 Hirsch, supra note 156 (“The restaurant trade group’s priority is getting rid 
of local laws in favor of one national, uniform standard for menu labeling, which it says 
will make it easier for the national chains to standardize their menus and policies.”). 
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prevent “a patchwork of harmful regulation and legislation” 
from springing up all around the country.160 
On September 17, 2009, the House of Representatives 
released H.R. 3590, formally known as the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).161 After resolving differences 
between the chambers, Congress passed the PPACA.162 Finally, 
on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the bill into law, 
and it became Public Law No. 111-148.163 After all the 
amendments, still included in the depths of this law is a menu-
labeling provision, which like the aforementioned local and 
state laws, requires certain restaurants and FSEs to post 
calorie information.164 
Section 4205 of the PPACA165 was the result of 
negotiations with the NRA, which, as noted above, wanted a 
solution to the ever-increasing disparities in the laws being 
enacted at the state and local levels.166 This provision requires 
restaurants and FSEs with twenty or more locations nationally 
to provide calorie information at the point-of-purchase for 
standard, unchanging food items, and to post this information 
in an obvious and unambiguous manner next to the name of 
each item on menus.167 Thus, this provision does not apply to 
items that are temporarily offered as a daily special, items that 
are not listed on the establishment’s menus such as condiments 
or custom orders, items offered on a menu for sixty days or less, 
nor items that are part of a traditional market test lasting less 
  
 160 Id. 
 161 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, TAXATION TIMES (Mar. 3, 
2010), http://www.taxationtimes.com/2010/124-stat-119/#history [hereinafter TAXATION 
TIMES Article]; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205 (2010), Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 162 TAXATION TIMES Article, supra note 161. 
 163 Id.; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b). 
 164 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b). 
 165 For a recent, more detailed discussion of the creation and requirements of 
section 4205, see Michelle I. Banker, I Saw the Sign: The New Federal Menu-Labeling 
Law and Lessons from Local Experience, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 904-07 (2010). See 
also Bernell, supra note 6, at 865-67.  
 166 See Margie King, New Federal Health Care Reform Legislation Requires 
Calorie Disclosure on Menus, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 30 2010, 9:40 PM), http://www. 
examiner.com/nutrition-in-philadelphia/new-federal-health-care-reform-legislation-requires-
calorie-disclosure-on-menus. 
 167 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); see also Schulman, 
supra note 6, at 608 (stating that restaurants will have to offer calorie information for 
these menu items “on menus, menu boards, and drive-through menus”). 
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than ninety days.168 The law also exempts small businesses 
from regulation.169 
Different from Regulation 81.50, the PPACA also 
requires that these establishments post on their menus a sort 
of warning statement, notifying customers of the suggested 
daily caloric intake.170 In addition, the law requires restaurants 
to clearly inform customers that if they are interested in 
knowing additional or more detailed nutritional information 
about each standard menu item, it will be made available to 
them upon request.171 Lastly, the law allows restaurants that do 
not fall under its purview to voluntarily disclose calories on 
their menus.172 
Ultimately, section 4205 will be enforced by the FDA.173 
In August, 2010, the FDA released both a draft guidance 
document describing implementation of certain portions of the 
law, and a final guidance document describing the effect the 
federal law will have on state and local laws already in 
existence.174 In these plans, the FDA recognized that the 
“industry may need additional information and time to comply 
with the new provisions” and that it expected “to refrain from 
enforcement action for a time period that will be provided in 
the guidance once it is finalized.”175 After this announcement, 
the FDA was expected to begin enforcing this mandate before 
2011.176 More importantly, the law requires that the FDA offer 
its final proposal for implementation of this regulation by 
  
 168 Schulman, supra note 6, at 608. 
 169 See id.; see also Jean Spencer, Menu Measure: Health Bill Requires Calorie 
Disclosure, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 22, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/03/22/menu-
measure-health-bill-requires-calorie-disclosure. 
 170 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); see also 
Schulman, supra note 6, at 608. 
 171 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b). 
 172 See id.  
 173 See King, supra note 166; see also Banker, supra note 165, at 906 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (“The statute also directs the FDA to consider a variety of 
potentially thorny practical issues while drafting regulations, including 
standardization of recipes and methods of preparation, reasonable variation in serving 
size and formulation of menu items, space on menus and menu boards, inadvertent 
human error, training of food service workers, and variations in ingredients. . . . [and] 
to specify the format and manner of the nutrient labels.”). 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. The FDA also asked the public to comment on what it believed would be 
a reasonable amount of time before demanding compliance. See id. 
 176 See, e.g., Client Advisory, FDA Moving Quickly to Enforce New Calorie 
Labeling Requirements for Restaurant Menus and Vending Machines, KELLEY DRYE (Oct. 
5, 2010), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/client_advisories/0597 [hereinafter Kelley 
Drye Client Advisory]. 
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March 23, 2011.177 By the time this note went to press, however, 
the FDA still had not set forth any proposals.  
Nevertheless, the law has been enacted, and although it 
may take some time,178 our nation is gearing up for the 
enforcement of national menu calorie disclosure.179 Congress 
has finally passed legislation that preempts almost all future 
menu calorie-disclosure regulations on the state and local level, 
and makes many existing regulations, including Regulation 
81.50, ineffective and void.180 
C. Potential Legal Challenges to the Federal Law 
Although most commentators have supported section 
4205 of the PPACA,181 the adoption of this national calorie-
disclosure law will still likely meet many forms of criticism. 
Since it was signed into law, the efficacy of this provision has 
already been criticized in some journal and law review articles 
for a variety of reasons, ranging from the fact that it does not 
include smaller restaurants within the scope of regulation to 
the fact that it only makes calorie-disclosure compulsory and 
does not require disclosure of other important information such 
  
 177 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b); Banker, supra note 
165, at 906 (“The statute gives the FDA a one year time limit to promulgate 
regulations for implementing its provisions and requires the agency to submit a 
quarterly report to Congress regarding the status of proposed regulations.”); see also 
Kelley Drye Client Advisory, supra note 176. 
 178 Spencer, supra note 169 (“The [FDA] needs to come up with regulations, and as 
a result, many Americans won’t likely see calories disclosures for three to four years.”); but 
see generally FDA Expects to Issue Menu Labeling Proposal by March 23, NAT’L REST. ASS’N, 
http://www.restaurant.org/nra_news_blog/2011/01/fda-expects-to-issue-menu-labeling-
proposal-by-march-23.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011); Andy Hodges, Fast Food Calories News 
Reveals Health Care Restaurant Law, NEWSOXY (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.newsoxy.com/ 
fast-food/calories-news-12833.html (“If a legal battle ensues, as often happens with new 
federal regulations, the effect date could conceivably be years away.”).  
 179 Claire E. Castles, For 500 Additional Calories, Do You Still Want Fries 
With That?, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Oct. 2010), http://www.abanet.org/health/esource/ 
Volume7/02/castles.html (“By removing the calorie and nutritional labeling exception 
for certain establishments from the federal labeling requirement, the industry may 
now rely on a federal standard for compliance with the labeling requirements.”).  
 180 See Rosenbloom, supra note 158 (“More than a dozen states have been 
considering labeling measures or have already passed them, though many have not yet 
taken effect. The new legislation overrides many existing laws, though some localities 
will be able to continue enforcing rules that are more stringent than the federal 
requirements. New York City, for instance, is expected to continue requiring chains 
with 15 or more outlets to post nutritional data, compared with the standard of 20 
outlets in the federal law.”).  
 181 See, e.g., Castles, supra note 179 (stating that this national decree will 
tremendously “assist in creating healthier communities, improve wellness and prevent 
disease”).  
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as fat content of food.182 The effectiveness of this law remains to 
be seen, and given the recent, inconsistent studies regarding 
the value of Regulation 81.50 in NYC, it is clear that it will 
take many years before a well-supported argument is 
possible.183 At this point, however, it is possible to predict 
forthcoming legal challenges to section 4205 of the PPACA.  
The lawsuit discussed in Part III of this note indicates 
that the federal law would likely survive a First Amendment 
challenge,184 but other constitutional challenges can still be 
expected.185 First, as some articles have suggested, “litigation 
may arise regarding the extent to which [section] 4205 
preempts state and local laws.”186 While this note agrees that 
such proceedings are inevitable, it is impossible at this point to 
determine the success or failure of such claims, as that will 
vary based on the specific attributes of the local or state law 
being challenged.187 Second, a lawsuit alleging that the federal 
calorie-disclosure law is unconstitutional under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment would not likely be successful, 
as this provision “targets a large subset of restaurants” and the 
government has at the very least a rational basis for the law.188 
Lastly, and discussed in some detail below, critics will likely 
  
 182 For arguments criticizing the compulsory menu labeling provision, see, for 
example, Banker, supra note 165, at 917-21, and Schulman, supra note 6, at 608-09 
(stating that the provision is “an excellent start,” but “it does not constitute an ideal 
solution to implementing menu-labeling policy on a national level if the goal is to 
maximize the policy’s potential impact on the national weight crisis” and that “it 
misses an important opportunity for broad menu-labeling implementation by 
exempting smaller, non-chain restaurants”). 
 183 This note does not discuss these studies in detail, as the impact of the new 
federal law is tangential to its main argument. For recent articles discussing the 
results of each study, see, for example, Schulman, supra note 6, at 599-603; Banker, 
supra note 165, at 911-13; Bernell, supra note 6, at 867-70; Sheila Flesichhacker & Joel 
Gittelsohn, Carrots or Candy in Corner Stores?: Federal Facilitators and Barriers to 
Stocking Healthier Options, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 23, 52 (2010) (“Even though the 
menu labeling law is based on a strong public health rationale and founded on 
consumer rights, further work is needed to understand the impact these policy changes 
have had (e.g. in New York) and will have (e.g. nationwide on consumer behavior, 
dietary intakes, and health conditions). Initial research on [Regulation 81.50] found 
some positive effects on low-income consumer awareness, but not any significant 
impacts on caloric consumption.”).  
 184 For a more detailed analysis of a potential First Amendment challenge to 
the PPACA, see generally Bernell, supra note 6, at 862-63. 
 185 For another recent discussion of the legal challenges the federal law will 
likely face, see id. at 861-64. 
 186 Banker, supra note 165, at 926.  
 187 One caveat to this statement is that in general, a preemption challenge 
may be successful if the law requires “claims” to be made, and not only “factual 
nutritional information.” Bernell, supra note 6, at 861-62.  
 188 Banker, supra note 165, at 927.  
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claim that the law is beyond Congress’s vested power to 
regulate interstate commerce.189 
Our federal Constitution bestows Congress with the 
power to regulate commerce through the Commerce Clause.190 
Since this grant of authority, “the . . . Court has extracted the 
notion that the Commerce Clause is an affirmative grant of 
power to Congress to restrict independent state action in order 
to promote nationwide free trade.”191 That is, besides its obvious 
ability to regulate interstate activities, Congress can regulate 
intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.192 Here, because of the variety of state and locally 
mandated menu calorie-disclosure laws established before the 
federal mandate was passed, “the burden on interstate 
commerce [was] certain, especially if states continue[d] to 
adopt different regulations.”193 
Critics will likely argue that the law does not fall within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. Specifically, they will 
contend that the states possess a “residuum of power” to create 
public health and safety laws, which reflect local concerns, 
even if these laws do affect interstate commerce.194 Such state 
laws are presumably valid and subject to such regulation 
because public health and welfare consistently fall within the 
ambit of state authority and are primarily local concerns.195 
These critics will reason that Congress is overstepping its 
bounds with such legislation and entering into state police-
power territory. 
However, it is not likely that this challenge would be 
successful. Today, the Court’s jurisprudence gives Congress 
  
 189 For another recent discussion of the likely commerce clause challenge, see 
id. at 927-28. 
 190 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. (“[The Congress shall have power] To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 191 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 507; see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 4 (1824) 
(where John Marshall first defined “commerce” to mean “intercourse,” and further 
explained that the Constitution uses the word “among,” indicating that power to regulate 
interstate commerce didn’t extend to commercial activities entirely within a state).  
 192 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). 
 193 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 525. Moreover, “in giving Congress the power to 
regulate commerce among the states, the Commerce Clause impliedly requires the 
states to refrain from placing economic barriers between themselves and other states 
that would disrupt the unified national economy.” Id. at 504. 
 194 See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[I]n the absence of 
conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make 
laws governing matters of local concern.”). 
 195 See id. 
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broad power under the Commerce Clause,196 and the disclosure 
of calorie content on chain restaurant menus would be an 
example of an activity that substantially affects interstate 
commerce. The sales from these regulated businesses 
unarguably affect interstate commerce, accounting for billions 
of dollars spent by American consumers.197 Moreover, chain 
establishments—those restaurants to be affected by such a 
regulation—are interstate in nature, as most of these 
companies have locations in more than one state.198 Thus, the 
burden on these businesses is an interstate one.199 For these 
reasons, the Court would likely find Congress well within its 
Commerce Clause authority to pass section 4205 of the PPACA.  
Further, section 4205 of the PPACA, in fact, decreases a 
burden on interstate commerce. Specifically, “[i]f the individual 
states [continued to] mandate[] dissimilar sets of rules and 
regulations according to their own interests, the nation would 
be nothing more than fifty independent countries coexisting 
under the guise of one name, each imposing its own taxes and 
other economic burdens on the other.”200 Every regulated 
restaurant and FSE would have had to follow a variety of 
regulations, as each law would be exclusive to its city or state. 
For that reason, it is likely that the Court would find that the 
Framers of our federal Constitution wanted to circumvent this 
type of arduous undertaking by granting supreme Commerce 
Clause power to our national Congress.201 
Another argument opponents may offer would center on 
the federalism theory that the states are the laboratories of 
  
 196 See Raich, 545 U.S. 1; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).  
 197 Elizabeth Young Spivey, Trans Fat: Can New York City Save Its Citizens 
from This “Metabolic Poison”?, 42 GA. L. REV. 273, 291 (citing ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST 
FOOD NATION: THE DARK SIDE OF THE ALL-AMERICAN MEAL 293 (2002)). “In 2001, 
Americans spent more than $110 billion on fast food, more than on higher education or 
new cars.” Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See supra text accompanying notes 127-30. 
 200 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 508; see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 
U.S. 525, 532 (1949) (stating that the national effect would “set a barrier to traffic between 
one state and another as effective as if customs duties, equal to the price differential, had 
been laid upon the thing transported” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 201 Gizzi, supra note 7, at 531 (“This onerous task is precisely what the 
Framers sought to avoid by creating a unified republic and vesting the Commerce 
Clause power in Congress.”); see also Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 
(1935) (“[The Constitution] was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation 
are in union and not division.”). 
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democracy.202 Those who are against the passage of the federal 
calorie-disclosure law would posit that the aforementioned 
burden on these restaurants is worth the cost. They would 
suggest that through varying attempts, the states would 
continue to strive for a perfect solution to these life-threatening 
epidemics and, ultimately, find a successful one.203 But these 
opponents fail to realize that the federal calorie-disclosure law 
does not fully rid the states of their authority within this 
realm. In fact, although the federal law in its current form 
preempts most state and local regulation, those governments 
may still pass laws for unregulated restaurants and may also 
still have more stringent disclosure requirements than the 
federal mandate.204 Accordingly, states may still experiment 
with new legislation and be within the broad scope of section 
4205 of the PPACA. Thus, although this constitutional 
challenge will likely arise, it is unlikely that it will prevail. 
V. WHERE SHOULD CONGRESS DRAW THE LINE? 
Americans enjoy being oblivious, so this federally 
mandated menu calorie-disclosure law is nothing short of a 
nightmare for many. The reality, unfortunately, is that our 
increasing national weight gain seems to be directly related to 
consistent dining in these regulated establishments, as their 
customers are eating not only a greater amount of food than 
they would at home, but are eating much unhealthier food as 
well.205 Now, in every town, city, and state, American citizens 
  
 202 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 
118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1261 (2009) (“Most theories of federalism rest upon an autonomy 
model that depicts states as sovereign policymaking enclaves, able to regulate separate 
and apart from federal interference. State autonomy helps create laboratories of 
democracy, diffuse power, foster choice, safeguard individual rights, and promote 
vibrant participatory opportunities for citizens.”).  
 203 Supporting this argument, in 1932, Justice Brandeis wrote, “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 204 See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 4205(b), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the 
U.S.C.); see also Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers Regarding the Effect of 
Section 4205 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 on State and 
Local Menu and Vending Machine Labeling Laws, FDA.GOV (Aug. 2010), http://www. 
fda.gov/Food/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/GuidanceDocuments/FoodLa
belingNutrition/ucm223408.htm.  
 205 For a more detailed discussion of the relative unhealthiness of food 
consumed outside the home, see Schulman, supra note 6, at 594-97. 
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will have to face the glaring truth of their food choices in these 
regulated restaurants and FSEs. Alas, illustrating how this 
will impact the American dining experience, one blogger wrote, 
The new calorie law is a murderer! Yes, it has killed my pleasure of 
eating out! . . . For Gods [sic] sake, who wants to know all this? I 
dine out once a week with my family simply for the pleasure of 
eating. I’m already savvy on a lot of calorie education, buddy! The 
television, newspapers, health journals, slimming spas, doctor’s [sic] 
chambers are all bombarding people day in and day out with 
information on calories and high and low calorie foods. I really don’t 
need to be reminded of all that once more when I’m going to a food 
joint to deliberately indulge in my favorite food once in a while.206 
But it is exactly this carefree attitude that has led to America’s 
unhealthy status. Although many commentators have noted 
that magazines, television, and other media sources are 
sufficient means to create widespread awareness on high and 
low calorie food choices, they have ignored that this method 
was practiced for years, without notable success. Likely, the 
reason for the failure of those methods is because when 
Americans read magazines or watch television they are not 
standing in line or sitting at a table, waiting to place an order 
for food. When calorie information is on menus, staring patrons 
in the face, it cannot be ignored or forgotten. 
Just as NYC inspired cities and states across the nation 
to adopt calorie-disclosure laws that ultimately led to the 
recent federal mandate, it has also inspired local and state 
governments to pass other innovative food laws designed to 
combat obesity, diabetes, and other life-threatening 
epidemics.207 This section addresses three recent NYC food-
based health initiatives in particular. First, NYC, in passing its 
trans fat ban,208 was the earliest of many state and local 
governments to enact such regulation.209 Second, NYC has 
  
 206 Who Cares for the Calorie Law?, IFOOD, http://www.ifood.tv/node/93263 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
 207 Does New York City’s Trans-Fat Ban Go Too Far?, ALLBUSINESS.COM (Jul. 
31, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/medicine-health/diseases-disorders-obesity/148834 
38-1.html (“New York City banned the use of trans fats in all restaurants in the city in 
2006. Philadelphia, California, Boston and Montgomery County, Md. have subsequently 
passed similar bans on the use of trans fats in restaurants.”).  
 208 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008). 
 209 New York Passes Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM (Dec. 5, 2006, 5:30 PM), http:// 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16051436/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition; see also Trans Fat Bans in 
Restaurants, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/transfat/index. 
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
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recently commenced a sodium reduction campaign210 that is also 
spreading across the nation.211 Third, NYC has just proposed its 
newest initiative: banning the use of food stamps to purchase 
sugary drinks.212 
While there is a lot of recent criticism that section 4205 
of the PPACA does not go far enough, our federal legislature 
should be wary of emulating the local and state food laws that 
go beyond mere information disclosure. Specifically, Congress 
should be careful not to pass laws similar to these other NYC 
food-targeting health-initiatives that regulate actual 
consumption. As many commentators have recently questioned 
where the legislative line should be drawn,213 this note suggests 
that it should be drawn at educational mandates. While all of 
NYC’s recent food laws are based on noble public goals, goals 
that could decrease the prevalence of obesity, diabetes, and 
other life-threatening epidemics in America, this note argues 
that some things should not be regulated at all.  
A. Funding the Epidemics 
It is no secret that American taxpayers are funding the 
growth of obesity, diabetes, and hypertension in America.214 The 
hypertension epidemic alone places a gigantic burden on our 
  
 210 Cutting Salt, Improving Health, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/ 
cardio/cardio-salt-initiative.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Cutting Salt]. 
 211 Legal and Policy Resources on Public Health “Winnable Battles,” Sodium 
Reduction, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www2a.cdc.gov/ 
phlp/winnable/sodium_reduction.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2011); see also Tiffany 
O’Callaghan, Next on New York’s Health Agenda: Curbing Salt Intake (Jan. 11, 2010), 
http://healthland.time.com/2010/01/11/next-on-new-yorks-health-agenda-curbing-salt-
intake (stating that the campaign “includes public health organizations from several 
different cities (including Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Seattle) and 
states (including Alaska, Delaware, Michigan, North Carolina, Tennessee).”). 
 212 See Press Release, News from the Blue Room, Mayor Bloomberg and 
Governor Patterson Propose Excluding Sugary Drinks from Food Stamp Purchases in 
New York City (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov (follow “News and Press Releases” 
hyperlink; then follow “2010 Events” hyperlink; then “October 2010” hyperlink; then 
scroll to “October 7, 2010”; then follow “Read the press release”) [hereinafter Sugary 
Drinks Press Release]. 
 213 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 720 (“Should governments 
intervene in a matter that is basically about choice? . . . Given the health crisis that the 
world is facing, legislation and programs at all levels should be allowed and 
encouraged.”); see also Scott Hensley, New York City Wants to Ban Food Stamps for 
Sodas, NPR HEALTH BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/10/07/ 
130399285/new-york-city-wants-to-ban-food-stamps-for-sodas; see also New York Passes 
Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM (DEC. 5, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16051436/ 
ns/health-diet_and_nutrition. 
 214 See Cummings, supra note 6, at 287 (“Taxpayers already bear a significant 
portion of the U.S. healthcare costs associated with obesity.”). 
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healthcare system, with costs around $73.4 billion in just 
2009.215 Moreover, even fifteen years ago, medical costs related 
to obesity, which were partially funded by Medicaid and 
Medicare, were around $78.5 billion per year.216 In fact, it has 
been estimated that by 2018, “the annual medical burden of 
obesity across all private and public payors [will] be as high as 
$344 billion per year.”217 This increase in the cost of healthcare 
is directly related to the increasing rates of obesity in our 
country.218 Although the idea of billions of dollars is not as 
shocking today as it once was,219 these startling statistics 
perhaps may be the basis for an argument in the near future 
claiming that the federal government should pass further 
regulations like the NYC schemes discussed below.220 Although 
many support such efforts, this kind of legislation damages the 
foundation that makes our country America the free and 
should not be considered by Congress.221 
B. NYC’s Uninspiring & Misguided Pursuits 
Many have questioned whether NYC should enact such 
paternalistic laws.222 Convincing arguments have been made on 
both sides of the debate.223 On the one hand, as noted above, the 
obesity crisis in America is out of control, costing citizens 
billions of dollars as well as their lives. On the other hand, we 
  
 215 See A Population-Based Policy and Systems Change Approach to Prevent and 
Control Hypertension, Institute of Medicine Consensus Report, INST. MED. NAT’L ACADS. (Feb. 
22, 2010), http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2010/A-Population-Based-Policy-and-Systems-Change-
Approach-to-Prevent-and-Control-Hypertension.aspx.  
 216 Specifically, these federal health-insurance programs paid for about half of 
these medical costs. See Castles, supra note 179 (citation omitted).  
 217 Id. (citation omitted). “Within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid, the 
Office of the Actuary provides annuals [sic] projections of health care spending for 
categories within the National Health Expenditure Accounts. The National Health 
Expenditure Accounts track health spending by source of funds . . . and by type of service 
or service providers.” Id. at 1 n.4. 
 218 See id. at 1. 
 219 See id. 
 220 “[I]f Americans [do] not slim down as a result of menu labeling, the 
government might require restaurants to take further action . . . and they’ll push for 
more . . . . I don’t think this is taking us down a very appetizing course.” Rosenbloom, 
supra note 158; see also Esther Choi, Trans Fat Regulation: A Legislative Remedy for 
America’s Heartache, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 507, 538 (2008). 
 221 “Derogative generalities such as the ‘nanny state,’ ‘big brother,’ and ‘food 
police’ are some of the characterizations used by citizens who oppose government 
regulation . . . .” Cummings, supra note 6, at 290-91.  
 222 See, e.g., Spivey, supra note 197, at 306 (“Does [New York City] have the 
power to enact this ban? . . . Should New York City enact this ban?”).  
 223 See generally id.  
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live in a country that is founded on few, but vital and 
fundamental, principles stemming from our federal 
Constitution. In the advent of the passage of the PPACA, and 
realistic threat of more paternalistic legislation passing in the 
future, this note sides with the latter in the debate.  
1. The Paternalistic Schemes 
This section offers a brief description of the three above-
mentioned NYC schemes and explains why they are inherently 
unconstitutional. The justification provided by NYC for each of 
these initiatives is that it would directly and effectively combat 
the startling and increasing rates of obesity, diabetes, and 
hypertension amongst its citizens.224 
a. Trans-Fat Ban 
In one of the most intrusive forms of government 
involvement to date, on December 5, 2006, NYC passed a 
regulation225 that restricts all restaurants that hold a permit by 
the NYC Health Department226 from including more than 0.5 
grams of artificial trans fats per serving227 in both food 
preparation and food served.228 However, the ban does not 
regulate natural trans fats, like those in dairy products or red 
meats.229 This amendment to the Health Code became effective 
on July 1, 2007, and allowed for a phase-in period of several 
months—between six and eighteen—depending on the use of 
trans fat in the establishment and the type of food it served.230 
  
 224 See Sugary Drinks Press Release, supra note 212; see also Cutting Salt, 
supra note 210; The Regulation to Phase Out Artificial Trans Fat in New York City 
Food Service Establishments, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/ 
cardio/cardio-transfat-bro.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Trans Fat Ban].  
 225 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008). 
 226 Trans Fat Ban, supra note 224.  
 227 This note does not discuss trans fats and the associated health risks in any 
detail; to learn more about this, see id.; see also The Campaign to Ban Partially 
Hydrogenated Oils, BAN TRANS FATS, http://www.bantransfats.com/abouttransfat.html 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
 228 See Trans Fat Ban, supra note 224.  
 229 Id. 
 230 See, e.g., Cardiovascular Disease Prevention, NYC.GOV, http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/doh/html/cardio/cardio-transfat-healthcode.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) 
(“[R]estaurants had until July 1, 2007, to make sure that all oils, shortening and 
margarine containing artificial trans fat used for frying or for spreads have less than 
0.5 grams of trans fat per serving. Oils and shortening used to deep fry yeast dough 
and cake batter were not included in the first deadline. The second deadline was July 
 
2011] THE RULES OF CONSUMPTION 1085 
NYC, again, was the first city in the country to enact such a 
ban,231 because, “[b]ased on the most conservative estimates, 
artificial trans fat kills at least 500 New Yorkers each 
year . . . .”232 
b. Sodium-Reduction Initiative 
On January 11, 2010, the Board of Health released the 
“National Salt Reduction Initiative,” which targets restaurants 
and FSEs and asks them to voluntarily reduce the salt levels in 
fare offered.233 NYC has appointed itself leader of this 
movement, seeking to reduce salt levels in both packaged and 
restaurant foods over the next five years by twenty-five 
percent.234 This initiative, if successful, could cut our national 
sodium intake by twenty percent.235 Unlike the mandatory trans 
fat ban, this scheme is currently voluntary.236 On the one hand, 
it is difficult to determine when this campaign will transform 
into a regulation, as many believe that it will not have a 
serious impact on national health because it does not seek to 
decrease sodium content enough.237 On the other hand, this 
campaign looks a lot like NYC’s original movement to cut trans 
fat from restaurant fare, which only became enforced after it 
did not work as a voluntary scheme.238 Accordingly, this note 
predicts that the sodium-reduction scheme will be compulsory 
in the very near future.  
  
1, 2008. By that date, all foods containing artificial trans fat must have less than 0.5 
grams of trans fat per serving.”).  
 231 New York Passes Trans Fat Ban, MSNBC.COM, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/ 
id/16051436/ns/health-diet_and_nutrition (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
 232 See Cardiovascular Disease Prevention, supra note 230.  
 233 Tyler Anderson, Hold the Salt: The Gathering Push for Sodium Reduction in 
Food Products, FOOD LIABILITY L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.foodliabilitylaw.com/ 
2010/01/articles/legislation-2/hold-the-salt-the-gathering-push-for-sodium-reduction-in-food-
products. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Cutting Salt, supra note 210; see also William Neuman, Citing Hazard, New 
York Says Hold the Salt, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/ 
business/11salt.html?_r=1. 
 237 See, e.g., Tom Randall & Shannon Pettypiece, New York Pushes for 25% 
Salt Reduction in U.S. Foods, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=21070001&sid=aMAGgUeMSmr4. 
 238 Neuman, supra note 236. 
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c. Food Stamp Restriction 
On October 10, 2010, NYC embarked on its most recent 
“public health push” when it asked the federal government to 
allow it to pass legislation that would ban citizens from using 
their food stamps to purchase sugary drinks that contain 
greater than ten calories per cup.239 But the law would not 
regulate beverages that do not contain added sugar, like juice 
or milk.240 Presently, the food stamp system, which has been in 
place for over fifty years, “does not . . . restrict any other foods 
based on nutrition.”241 The only limitations on food stamps are 
that they may not be used to purchase “alcohol, cigarettes or 
items such as pet food, vitamins or household goods.”242 The 
intention of the food stamp program is to aid those who need 
assistance, and not to dictate what they should or should not 
eat.243 Today, 1.7 million NYC residents receive food stamps and 
spend about $135 million a year on sugary drinks.244 
2. Due Process Concerns 
Many NYC restaurant owners and patrons have 
opposed these campaigns and expressed their discontent with 
the government dictating what they can serve or eat.245 What 
these dissatisfied citizens likely do not realize, however, is that 
they are victims of more than just frustration, because with 
each enactment of these paternalistic schemes, they have also 
had one of their most fundamental rights violated. At the core 
of the problem is that American citizens have a right to 
privacy,246 and within that right, the privilege to determine 
what enters their bodies—or, in other words, to decide what 
  
 239 See Sugary Drinks Press Release, supra note 212; see also Hensley, supra 
note 213.  
 240 Hensley, supra note 213. 
 241 NY Seeks to Ban Sugary Drinks from Food Stamp Buys, AETNA INTELIHEALTH, 
http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/EMI/333/8015/1377711.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011). 
 242 Id. 
 243 See, e.g., Keep the Fizz in Foodstamps, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2010, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/10/19/747915/keep-the-fizz-in-food-stamps.html.  
 244 Terry J. Allen, Should Food Stamps Be Used for Soda?, ALTERNET (Dec. 7, 
2010), http://www.alternet.org/vision/149116/should_food_stamps_be_used_for_soda. 
 245 Arun Kristian Das, Chefs Call Proposed New York Salt Ban ‘Absurd,’ MYFOXNY 
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/local_news/new_york_state/chefs-call-prop 
osed-new-york-salt-ban-absurd-20100310-akd (“[C]hefs and restaurant owners . . . are tired of 
politicians dictating what they can serve and what people can eat. They have opposed the city’s 
anti-sodium and anti-trans fat campaigns.”).  
 246 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).  
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they will or will not consume. Although many have opined that 
NYC has acted within its broad police powers to preserve 
public health and therefore has not overstepped its 
boundaries,247 these arguments fail to recognize that the above-
mentioned regulation and pursuits offend our federal laws and 
are unconstitutional. 
Although these regulations and pursuits would not 
likely violate the Commerce Clause248 or the Equal Protection 
Clause249 of our federal Constitution, all of these initiatives that 
go beyond information disclosure violate the Due Process 
clauses.250 The Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments mandate that neither the federal government nor 
any state “shall . . . deprive [any person] of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.”251 Similar to the First 
Amendment analysis discussed in Part III of this note,252 courts 
decide challenges based on substantive due process using levels 
of scrutiny to determine how much protection it will afford to 
the right in question.253 Not all of our privileges as citizens are 
explicitly stated in the federal Constitution itself, but the Court 
has commonly found that the fundamental rights recognized in 
its jurisprudence are implicitly contained therein.254 The Court 
  
 247 See generally Spivey, supra note 197, at 293-94. 
 248 See id. at 294, 306. The only way, it seems, that such federal action could 
be problematic is if these issues were deemed by a federal court to be strictly of state 
concern, and thus the federal scheme would violate the Tenth Amendment. See 
Flesichhacker & Gittelsohn, supra note 183, at 35; see also Sarah Romero, Local Bans 
on Trans Fats: A New (and Legal) Way Forward, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (Apr. 5, 2007), 
http://hlpronline.com/2007/04/transfat. For an argument to the contrary, see Katharine 
Kruk, Of Fat People and Fundamental Rights: The Constitutionality of the New York 
City Trans-Fat Ban, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 864 (2010). 
 249 Does New York City’s Trans-Fat Ban Go Too Far?, supra note 207; see also Is 
the New York City Board of Health’s Ban on Trans Fats in Restaurants Constitutional?, 
HELIUM: USNEWS (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.helium.com/items/1015112-is-the-new-york-
city-board-of-healths-ban-on-trans-fats-in-restaurants (“The Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits invidious discrimination, such as racial discrimination. ‘People in New York City’ 
or ‘people who like to eat trans fats’ are a far cry from the types of victims that the 14th 
Amendment was designed to protect. The Equal Protection Clause does not apply.”). 
 250 This note focuses solely on the substantive due process rights of American 
citizens that may be violated, and does not cover any economic due process 
infringements committed against the restaurant industry. For a discussion on whether 
a challenge brought against the New York City trans fat ban on economic due process 
grounds would be successful, see Kruk, supra note 248, at 866-67 (“[C]ourts would 
likely decline to overturn the trans-fat ban based on an alleged infringement of the 
substantive, economic due process rights of New York City restaurateurs.”).  
 251 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
 252 See supra text accompanying notes 74-100. 
 253 See Kruk, supra note 248, at 864.  
 254 See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating that these 
rights are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”).  
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has found that substantive due-process rights are two-fold: the 
right must be “deeply rooted in [the] Nation’s history and 
tradition,”255 and it must be carefully described.256 If the Court 
determines that the legal interest being challenged is a 
fundamental right, the challenged restriction on the right will 
be subject to the highest level of scrutiny.257 
The Court has decided many cases regarding “the right 
to privacy and other constitutionally-guaranteed, fundamental 
rights” and it has evaluated each of these cases “under the 
framework of strict scrutiny,” which, is the ultimate safeguard 
of due process rights.258 Most notably, the Court has applied 
strict scrutiny to a woman’s right to an abortion,259 which could 
be indicative of a fundamental right of Americans to control 
what does or does not enter their bodies.260 Each of the three 
recent NYC initiatives restrains the ability of residents to 
make their own consumption decisions; that is, to decide what 
ingredients or food products may or may not enter their bodies. 
If Congress responds to the recent critiques of section 4205 of 
the PPACA261 by emulating these NYC laws, it is likely that it 
would be challenged as infringing on the guarantees of the due 
process clause.262 This note predicts that the Court would strike 
down any such additions or amendments as unconstitutional.  
It is likely that the Court would analyze the addition of 
any paternalistic restriction under strict scrutiny because these 
  
 255 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
see also Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. 
 256 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 257 See Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. 
 258 Kruk, supra note 248, at 864 & n.57 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-48 (1992) for the idea that the Constitution guarantees “a 
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter”). 
 259 See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 845-48; see also City of Akron v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973). 
 260 See generally Control Over One’s Body Not Just Right of Pregnant Women, 
STATE NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.statenews.com/index.php/article/2008/10/ 
control_over_ones_body_not_just_right_of_pregnant_women (“[A]n adult has the basic 
right of controlling his or her own body. . . . [T]his also must include controlling all of 
one’s own body, not just abortion.”); see also Kruk, supra note 248, at 865 (“Health-
related rights are generally considered to be part of the bundle of privacy rights that 
are given strict scrutiny in the Due Process Clause context . . . protecting the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s ever-evolving realm of personal liberty.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 261 Many articles have critiqued the federal government for not going far 
enough with the law. See, e.g., Schulman, supra note 6. 
 262 As the federal equivalent of these laws is unconstitutional, for the same 
reasons this note contends that the law passed by NYC is equally unconstitutional. 
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NYC initiatives infringe a fundamental right. Assuming that 
the Court would find that the “right to make dietary 
decisions”263 or the right to determine what enters your body is 
a fundamental right,264 to survive strict scrutiny analysis the 
government would have to set forth a compelling justification 
for its law, showing the gravity of its interest in passing the 
law and that the regulation has been as narrowly-tailored as 
possible.265 To be narrowly tailored, the challenged legislation 
cannot be either overinclusive or underinclusive in its scope.266 
The government’s proposed rationale would be the same 
as the rationale for its menu calorie-disclosure provision: to 
improve the health of citizens by decreasing rising national 
epidemics.267 Although this goal of reducing the prevalence of 
serious national epidemics would most likely be found to be 
compelling,268 the government’s position would certainly fail on 
the narrow-tailoring prong of the analysis, as each of these 
measures are underinclusive.269 
  
 263 Kruk, supra note 248, at 871.  
 264 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (discussing the 
importance of fundamental rights in the realm of personal-health choices).  
 265 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Our opinions applying the doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the 
Due Process Clause prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless 
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). 
 266 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New 
Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447, 478 (1989) (“Under strict scrutiny, apparently any 
overinclusion or underinclusion is too much.” (citing Arkansas Writers’ Project v. Ragland, 
481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969))). 
 267 See generally Press Release, FDA, FDA Releases Guidance on Federal Menu 
Labeling Requirements (Aug. 24, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm223880.htm. The rationale underlying the New 
York City trans fat law sheds some guidance on what the purported federal justification 
would be. The Board of Health stated that 
[t]his amendment to the Health Code is promulgated pursuant to §§ 558 and 
1043 of the Charter. Section 558(b) and (c) of the Charter empowers the 
Board of Health to amend the Health Code and to include in the Health Code 
all matters to which the Department’s authority extends. Section 1043 grants 
the Department rule-making authority. 
N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, BD. OF HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF 
AN AMENDMENT (§ 81.08) TO ARTICLE 81 OF THE NEW YORK CITY HEALTH CODE 1 (2006) 
[hereinafter NOTICE OF ADOPTION 3]. 
 268 The Court has previously held that safeguarding the public health is a 
compelling interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147-64 (1973); see also Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 538 (1993) (stating, in dicta, that 
protecting the public interest is a legitimate governmental interest).  
 269 Kruk, supra note 248, at 873 n.137 (“An underinclusive statute is one that 
fails to extend to all matters that should properly be addressed by a particular 
ordinance or regulation.”). 
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First, the trans fat law is underinclusive as it only 
regulates artificial trans fats.270 Artificial trans fats only 
account for 80% of trans fats used in food preparation in 
restaurants and FSEs;271 and so the ban, in its current form, 
“only applies to four-fifths” of the problem.272 Clearly, the ban 
could be more narrowly tailored if it applied to currently 
exempt items such as natural trans fats, products sold in 
grocery stores, and/or food sold in restaurants in their original 
packaging.273 As these items are not included in the regulation, 
it follows that only a limited and specific portion of trans fats 
are being regulated, meaning that the ban is not narrowly 
tailored. 
Second, it has been argued that the salt-reduction 
campaign does not go far enough to make any real difference as 
it only bans a minimal amount of sodium in regulated 
products.274 Likewise, the voluntary scheme only targets about 
75 to 80 percent of the average person’s daily salt intake.275 In 
addition, the sodium-reduction campaign does not target table 
salt, which may still be placed on tables at these 
establishments, ready for consumer overuse.276 Accordingly, this 
scheme is also poorly tailored.  
Finally, there is no doubt the Court would find that the 
food-stamp proposal is inadequately tailored. To start, this 
scheme only applies to a particular class of people, those using 
food stamps, and fails to regulate all other persons who do not 
use food stamps. Also, the ban would prevent the use of food 
stamps to purchase soda and other sugary drinks, but still 
allows for the purchase of other unhealthy and very sugary 
foods.277 Thus, like the trans fat ban and sodium-reduction 
  
 270 N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b) (2008). 
 271 NOTICE OF ADOPTION 3, supra note 267, at 2.  
 272 Kruk, supra note 248, at 874.  
 273 See N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 81.08(a)-(b). 
 274 See, e.g., Randall & Pettypiece, supra note 237 (“The salt reduction won’t 
have as much impact on national health as [other initiatives like the calorie law and the 
trans fat law]. . . . A 50 percent reduction would be more appropriately ambitious.”).  
 275 Chuck Bennett, Food-Nanny Mike Declares War on Salt in NYers Diets, N.Y. 
POST (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/food_nanny_mike_to_ny_halt_ 
the_salt_XpeycWZo3bLV2ODxFkv8VM.  
 276 Id. 
 277 See Sherry F. Colb, No Buying Soda with Food Stamps? Considering Mayor 
Bloomberg’s New Health Initiative, FINDLAW (Oct. 27, 2010), http://writ.news.findlaw. 
com/colb/20101027.html (stating that there are “two under-inclusiveness problems 
involved in cutting sodas out of Food Stamp eligibility—as to the targeted population 
(only people receiving food stamps, rather than everyone in [NYC]) and as to the targeted 
products (sugary sodas, instead of all unhealthy foods)”). 
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pursuit, this measure would likely be struck down as 
unconstitutional. 
C. The Better Solution: Mandate More Educational 
Programs 
The federal menu calorie-disclosure law is a great start, 
but, as discussed above, Congress should avoid copying all of 
the NYC food-based health initiatives. Instead, our federal 
government should continue to explore other edifying, 
information-disclosure methods for regulation, as these 
methods do not compromise any fundamental rights 
guaranteed in our federal Constitution.278 This section discusses 
how the federal government has already implemented and 
should continue to adopt educational methods to combat our 
national epidemics.  
In a 2003 speech, a former United States Surgeon 
General coined the phrase “health literacy,” which is “the 
ability of an individual to understand, access, and use health-
related information and services.”279 Even before its new menu 
calorie-disclosure law, our federal government has taken this 
health-literate approach towards educating the public about 
their food choices. For example, the FDA enacted a rule in 
2006, which requires all manufacturers of food products to 
state on the product’s Nutrition Facts label, in a separate line 
immediately under the statement of the product’s saturated 
fats, the amount of trans-fatty acids it contains.280 This 
legislation, functionally speaking, does not “ban nor reduce the 
amount of trans-fats present in grocery store food. . . . [but 
rather] simply serve[s] to make consumers aware of what they 
are eating.”281 Thus, this recent regulation recognizes that 
American citizens should be informed about how much trans 
fat is contained within the food they purchase and does not 
create the same legal predicament as the NYC trans fat ban.  
The principle is simple: instead of telling the public 
what to consume, teach them about what they are consuming 
so that they can make informed choices. This note urges 
  
 278 For a fantastic discussion of the appeal of information disclosure laws and 
their effects, see Winkles, supra note 133, at 557-72. 
 279 Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon Gen., Remarks at the Am. 
Enter. Inst. Obesity Conference (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/ 
news/speeches/obesity061003.htm; see also Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 6, at 725. 
 280 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.1-.106 (2006). 
 281 Kruk, supra note 248, at 862.  
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Congress to continue to enact mandates similar to the FDA’s 
trans-fat-disclosure law and the PPACA’s menu calorie-
disclosure provision, as they will educate our nation without 
infringing on fundamental rights. Most importantly, by 
increasing society’s knowledge through these measures, the 
federal government could potentially influence patrons to 
demand healthier options from regulated establishments, 
which would slowly eradicate our frightening national 
epidemics, without sacrificing America the free.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The legal and social successes of Regulation 81.50 
served as important inspiration for our federal government. As 
obesity and diabetes have become national health concerns, 
NYC pioneered a crucial step towards a healthier America. 
With simple calorie disclosure, consumers are educated about 
their food choices but still maintain the option of ignoring this 
nutritional information. Thus, although their enjoyment of 
their fare may be compromised, they still get to decide what 
they consume. Unfortunately, NYC’s other recent food-based 
health initiatives have headed down a dangerous and 
unconstitutional path. NYC’s recent schemes undermine the 
very foundation of one of the most important rights granted to 
all citizens by our federal Constitution. For that reason, 
Congress should not attempt to emulate these initiatives, but 
should instead focus its attention on creating more educational, 
information-disclosure regulations. It is these instructive 
mandates that will benefit our nation most of all.  
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